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Abstract 
Much of the existing literature on the modern state of Algeria reinforces rivalry-based 
understandings of the politico-linguistic infrastructure that overemphasize the presence of a 
dichotomy (French v. Arabic) in the linguistic make up of the state. Many studies rely on this 
construction of an Algerian language dichotomy to predict the future of the state, while; in 
fact, more attention should be paid to the multilingual, multicultural, and multinational 
reality of the larger demographic. Algeria’s history of language rationalization has laid the 
foundation for unique institutional reflections of state power dynamics within a multilingual 
environment. Discussions of Algeria’s historical background, identity construction, 
revolutionary movements, nationalism, and the future of Algerian governance would benefit 
from a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary exploration of the language attitudes that 
exist across demographics. This paper explores works by sociolinguists such as Hafid 
Gafaïti, Wallace Lambert, and Mohamed Benrabah and political scientists such as Lindsay 
Benstead, Amaney Jamal, and Megan Reif to develop how sociolinguistic survey 
methodologies such at the Matched Guise technique might be utilized to form a better 
understanding of Algeria’s political prospects. 
Keywords: Algeria, language hegemony, post-colonialism, nationalism, democratization, 
Arabic, French, Tamazight, multilingualism, multiculturalism, mononationalism. 
	  
  
There are few countries as little studied and as much misunderstood as modern 
Algeria, at least in the English-speaking world. 
– Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (1997, p.1) 
Introduction 
According to Martin Stone, Algeria has been understudied and overlooked as a state, perhaps 
especially of late as the world’s attention has been turned towards other North African states 
experiencing significant political unrest (i.e. Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt). Interestingly, his 
qualifying addition “…at least in the English-speaking world” makes a perhaps unintentional nod 
to the role that language has played in the Algerian case. Stone means to highlight the extent to 
which French and Algerian scholars have explored the Algerian situation, which literature in 
English has neglected. However his quote also subtly touches on the idea of how language is an 
integral component of any Algerian study.  
North Africa is the site of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, otherwise known as the Arab Spring, and 
the series of events that have occurred in its wake will certainly continue to have effects on the 
region. Algeria in particular is a unique case, and the question of how the Algerian state dealt 
with the impact of the regional upheaval has been asked by political scientists, sociologists, and 
experts within a variety of other disciplines.  Though it is disingenuous to claim that Algeria did 
not participate in the Arab Uprisings, the country did not experience the level of political unrest 
that its neighbors of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt did. There were minor protests and calls for 
democratic reform that echoed those in the nearby countries, though the Algerian regime only 
responded with limited liberalization of existing policies and limited economic cushion. In the 
wake of these events, I contend that it is important to revisit the discussion of Algeria’s linguistic 
history and the implications of multilingual communities existing within a mononational1 state. 
This thesis will first explore the historical background of Algeria both from a political and a 
linguistic angle. As is to be expected from such a linguistically diverse environment, at many 
points throughout the state’s history, these two facets are indivisibly enmeshed. Next, there will 
be an exploration of linguistic theory. This will include a minor focus on sociolinguistic survey 
methodology called the Matched Guise Technique and how it and similar language attitude 
studies can both help garner knowledge and potentially hinder social and political movements. 
Thirdly, this thesis will propose that this type of interdisciplinary work is the necessary 
component to developing a more comprehensive and better-understood picture of the modern 
Algerian context.  
 
Algeria’s Background 
Algeria is a fascinating politico-linguistic case study, in part due to its unique pre-colonial, 
colonial, and post-independence history compared to the parallel history of the neighboring 
states. The state withstood a longer, harsher colonial period than Morocco and Tunisia, as well as 
fighting a decidedly more violent war for independence and a significant internal civil war in the 
1990s. Since winning independence, the longstanding nationalist regime of Algeria has steered 
the state away from much of the cultural acclimation to the legacy and infrastructure left by 
France. One of the clearest signals of this intent is seen in how discussion of the language issue 
is dealt with by state policies. As the young state has matured, language has been both a dividing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As far as the centralized government of Algeria is concerned, the state is a mononational one. 
and central factor within political and cultural movements. On the other hand, Algeria readily 
adopted the French tradition of Jacobinism that guides today’s state with a strong centralized and 
socialist government (Benrabah, 2014). The form of government that harkens back to the 
revolutionary movements of France is now the same form of government that resisted a thread of 
upheaval at a time when revolution was occurring all across North Africa.  
It is important to acknowledge the pre-colonial context of Algeria as a subtle foundation to 
the context of the modern state. The indigenous communities that populated the region during 
the Ottoman Empire still have strong voices in the modern state, some demographics more so 
than others. While the Ottoman Empire didn’t fully collapse until the early 1900s, the region it 
covered began shrinking decades earlier. North Africa, originally a fairly self-governed sphere 
within the empire, saw a wave of European colonization much earlier than the Gulf and Levant 
states. Algeria was the earliest of the colonized regions in North Africa (Lust, 2014).  
Though much of the scholarly conversation emphasizes the influence of the colonial era on 
the modern day language trends, it is important to remember that there was an existing language 
environment far before the era of French colonialism. Hafid Gafaïti, an Algerian scholar who left 
the country in the aftermath of the civil war, introduces part of his argument with a reminder that 
much of Algeria has a history of the oral transmission of culture. Indigenous communities 
include five distinct Berber2 cultures, most notably the Kabyle. Prior to French colonization, the 
prominent languages of Algeria included these varieties of Berber languages and the colloquial 
variation of Arabic (Gafaïti, 2002). These indigenous languages and the communities that speak 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  term	  Berber	  comes	  from	  the	  word	  Barbary,	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary,	  was	  ascribed	  to	  the	  indigenous	  people	  of	  North	  Africa	  by	  Arab	  geographers	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  region	  as	  a	  “land	  of	  barbarians”	  (Oxford	  English	  Dictionary).	  
them were both marginalized and, to a limited extent, supported during the colonial era. Many 
Algerian intellectuals have come from within the Berber communities and their training often 
occurred overseas in academic institutions in France.  
Colonial Era 
Compared to its neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, the colonial period in Algeria was 
significantly longer and much more destructive. Algeria became a protectorate of France in 
18303. As the colonial force, France’s modus operandi was to deconstruct the entire existing 
infrastructure of the society, and replace it with the French approach to governance (Taleb 
Ibrahimi, 1997). Any existing economic, political, judicial, academic, etc. institutions were 
restructured to indoctrinate the North African society with the dogma of French society. Taleb 
Ibrahim cites the Minister of Education of 1897, A. Rambaud, who explains the series of 
conquests by the French against Algerian society: 
The first conquest of Algeria was accomplished by the military in 1871 with 
the disarming of the Kabyle. The second conquest consisted of making the indigenous 
accept our administration and our justice. The third conquest will be done by the 
school: it will ensure the dominance of our language over the various local dialects, 
instilling into the Muslims the idea that we are all of France and for its role in the 
world…4 (p. 37) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Tunisia and Morocco became French protectorates in 1881 and 1912, respectively. (CIA, 2013) 
4 “La premiere conquete de l’Algerie a été accomplice par les armes et s’est terminée en 1871 par 
le désarmement de la Kabylie. La seconde conquête a consisté à faire accepter par les indigenes 
notre administration et notre justice. La troisieme conquête se fera par l’Ecole: elle devra assurer 
la predominance de notre langue sur les divers idioms locaux, inculquer aus musulmans l’idée 
que nous avons nous-mêmes de la France et de son role dans le monde…” A. Rambaud (Taleb 
Ibrahimi, 1997, p.37) 
Rambaud’s quote illustrates the deliberate course that France took to assimilate Colonial 
Algeria into French culture. However, his word choice as he labels the French language “notre 
langue” against the indigenous “idiomes locaux” gives away a classic example of the orientalist, 
racist attitude towards colonized cultures. In this instance, it is clear that this same distinction is 
being made between the civilized French language and Algerian “dialects”, which were seen as 
unsophisticated– an attitude that has been internalized and is still ascribed to colloquial 
variations today5. Though much of the pre-colonial history was stripped away by the ferocity of 
French acculturation during the colonial period, the indigenous culture and heritage is still 
present in the variety of Berber cultures that exist in Algeria today. Algeria’s long period of 
colonial oppression under the French included a promotion of the French language as the official 
language of Algeria, and the labeling of Arabic as a “foreign language” in 1938.  
The expanse of literature on orientalism6 as it relates to North Africa and the region’s 
colonial period is useful to help understand the colonial tactic to foster elites from minority 
communities (i.e. the indigenous Berber cultures). During the colonial era, France made 
deliberate moves to foster elites from within each community in order to appease those who, if 
unsatisfied, had enough social leverage to push back against colonial rule. Alongside this 
strategy, the colonial force had a history of catering to an extent to minorities, a tactic that has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “The debasement of dialectical Arabic has reinforced the diglossic condition of Algerians”, with 
implications for both gender and generational spectrums (Berger, 2002). Diglossic being a 
linguistic term for speakers using two (or more) language variations in their daily life. Today, 
youth educated in Arabized classrooms grow up to not speak the same variety of Arabic their 
fathers, and more often, their mothers speak. This has lead to attitudinal shifts relating to 
language and only reinforces the generational differences that reflect a shift in identity 
construction and the individuals’ relationships to Algeria’s colonial and indigenous past. 
6 Said (1977) explores a variety of definitions of orientalism. I aim to remind readers that, in a 
general sense, the idea of orientalism serves to provide a distinction between the West (European 
and American powers) and the Orient (any culture which might be “other”). Western powers, like 
France, colonizing North Africa are inextricably involved in Orientalized thinking because of 
their blatant labeling of the indigenous groups as “other”, uncivilized, barbaric, etc.  
long been used to stratify communities so as to maintain a vice grip on power. For example, via 
the Decret Cremieux, France granted French citizenship automatically to 37,000 Jews, which 
was not made available to Algerian Muslims, etc. (Dourari, 2014). Similarly, the French 
government often aligned itself with the Kabyle community7. Excepting a few elite from the 
Arab communities, to be Arab in colonial Algeria was to be foreign and barbarian, while the 
Berber community8, in particular the Kabyle, saw less marginalization by the French. In many 
cases, Kabyle communities were sponsored, by the French, as a gambit in France’s “divide and 
rule” strategy. Kabyles were often educated within the private academic institutions and given 
special treatment over the Arab majority. (Dourari, 2014) 
This community is not only significant due to their history as a less marginalized class of the 
colonial period but also because of the ideological stance they aligned themselves with during 
the independence struggle and their civil and political presence since. The modern rivalry 
between Kabyle and state groups originated in colonial times and became more pronounced 
during and in the aftermath of the independence struggle (Benrabah, 2014). Though both groups 
saw a future for an independent Algerian state, there was a conflict of interest where the question 
of identity lay. The Kabyle vision of an “Algerian Algeria” is a secularist, inclusive one. 
(Benrabah, 2014) In the more recent years (early 2000s) the Kabyle movement to promote 
linguistic pluralism and cultural inclusion has become a broader movement that incorporates the 
goals and aspirations of the younger generation of Algeria. Since the Berber Spring, the Kabyle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Kabyle are the largest of the minority Berber demographics in Algeria, followed by the 
Chouia, the Mzab, and the Tuareg… (CIA, 2013) 
8 Historically, there is a debate surrounding whether the Berber cultures are linked to a European 
bloodline. As such, there is a rhetoric surrounding the Berber cultures’ ability to be easily 
civilized in a way that Arabs are not thought of as civilizable. This point of contrast between the 
Berberophone and Arabophone Algerians is one of those attitudinal relics from the colonial era 
that has been reshaped into the continued rivalry between the modern-day communities. 
movement has begun calling more broadly for democratic reform and a liberalization of the 
NLF’s policies, including for liberalized, pluralistic educational policies that the original 
reformist Kabyle leadership of the older generation sought. Despite the Kabyle legacy that 
rejects the Arab-Islamic identity prescribed by the NLF government, it is undisputed that Islam 
& Classical Arabic functioned as revolutionary tools against French colonialism. (Dourari, 2014) 
Algerian Independence  
As Algerians were fighting against the colonial power, there were two major factions of anti-
colonial resistance. The reformist movement, which is linked to a pluralist and largely Kabyle 
community, and the nationalist movement, which is linked to the current regime. The National 
Liberation Front (FLN in the French acronym), still the dominant conservative party of the 
modern state, are steadfastly aligned with a mononational Arab-Islamic identity. The reformist 
movement, which worked alongside the nationalists in the fight for independence, originated 
from within the Berber community. They too called for an independent Algeria, yet envisioned a 
future state that would be a pluralistic, cohesive vision of what would remain of the colonial era. 
Immediately upon entering the era of Algerian statehood, these two political forces that had 
worked together to win an independent state split. The nationalist movement consolidated into 
the centralized government that is still the current regime, while the reformists were excluded 
from the newly formed government.  
The new FLN regime, for a short time under the elected president Ahmed Ben Bella, and 
later under President Boumédiène, nationalized the economy of Algeria and steered clear of 
liberalizing modernization policies. As a socialist regime, the premise of the new state was to 
support the poor classes within Algeria and boost the economy, which up until the discovery of 
oil in 1956 during the war for independence, had relied upon agricultural and mineral industries. 
The nationalization of the state’s economy, now largely based on oil revenue, would support the 
regime as well as provide subsidies and public goods to the populace (Lust, 2014). However, in 
the subsequent years, this intention fell to the wayside. Now, the implications of the economic 
structuring by the FLN have lead to severe underemployment and economic stability within 
lower classes and youth demographics. 
As the nationalist FLN regime failed to provide necessary goods and services, leaving 
Algerians to worry about employment, housing, medical facilities, and education, President 
Boumédiène died in 1978 (Lust, 2014). The disappearance of his personable and strong 
leadership role left the state in the hands of Chadli Benjedid, who did not have the same 
comprehensive grip on Algerian leadership. A populace worried about their livelihoods and 
living conditions engaged in protests across the country throughout the 80s, culminating in a 
major national outburst of 1988. It was during this same period of time that the regime’s 
educational policy known as Arabization began to falter. It is salient to make note of its 
paralleled time frame alongside the protests of the 1980s, and it is relevant to further explore the 
implications of the regime’s stringent language policies. 
Upon independence, Arabic was quickly adopted by the new nationalist state as the “official 
language” without any parallel acknowledgment of the native Berber languages. In fact, shortly 
thereafter, Berber culture and the Berber languages were banned under the centralized FLN 
regime that has remained in power since 1956. Bouteflika, the current president has outwardly 
spoken against the Berber cultures and languages. In 1976, a presidential ordinance announced 
the “total Arabization” (Benrabah, 2014) of the Algerian infrastructure.  The Arabization policies 
enforced the marginalization of the Berber languages and have certainly reinforced attitudes 
towards the French language. In modern Algeria, Tamazight wasn’t acknowledged as a national 
language until 2002. Only recently has there been institutional room made for the teaching of 
Berber languages. Though throughout the 1970s, the Arabization movement had been gaining 
strength and momentum, the Berber Spring of the 80s brought that trajectory of “totalized 
Arabization” to a trickle. In the 1980s, the Berber issue came to the forefront of the political 
atmosphere resulting from a series of protests and riots, largely by Kabyle leadership and Kabyle 
youth who were rebelling against their Arabized academic environment (Benrabah, 2014). 
Antecedents of Algerian Uprisings 
There are connective fibers that link the series of cultural and revolutionary movements that 
have occurred in Algeria. The Algerian Berber Spring of the 1980s, the protests of October 1988, 
the “civil war” of the early 90s, the Black Spring of 2001, and the Arab Uprisings of 2011 all 
share common threads that are emerging from Algeria’s colonial and post-independence history. 
Throughout these significant moments in Algeria’s history, there are through lines grounded in 
the intersection of culture, often oriented around the issue of language, and the challenging of the 
political status quo. Demographically, Algeria is racially and religiously homogeneous (CIA, 
2013), an idea which has only been bolstered by the state-promoted concept of Algerian identity. 
Policies such as educational Arabization were tools to reinforce this identity. Despite the state’s 
homogeneity, plurality is a foundational characteristic of Algeria. Though the racial and religious 
distinctions are few, Algeria is uniquely diverse in regards to its tribal, linguistic, and geographic 
communities (Dourari, 2014). Many of these moments in Algeria’s history centered around or 
grew out of movements calling for authentic cultural representation.  
The Berber Spring 
The Berber Spring was a period beginning in 1980 and continuing through the 80s, as the 
face of the regime was changing. While the Berber Spring is uniquely connected to cultural and 
linguistic rights, specifically those of the Berber (largely Kabyle) community, as the 80s wore on 
other segments of the country also participated in protests. Weakened leadership and growing 
economic pressures on youth and the lower classes lead to a series of protests in the late 80s. In 
1988, the protests grew to a climax and there were protests in Algiers and other urban centers 
against economic circumstances, oil wealth distribution, and for democratic reform (Ibrahim, 
1988).  
The Algerian civil war & Near Democracy 
Following the Berber Spring and the nationwide protests against the nationalist regime and 
its policies, the Algerian government made major adjustments to the party laws and electoral 
process (Lust, 2014). Party restrictions were lifted and a variety of new political parties were 
formed. Elections were held in the early 1990s and, in a surprising turn of events, in 1992 an 
Islamist party (Islamic Salvation Front; FIS) won municipal elections. The FLN was scrambling 
to regain power and the military9, a pillar of the nationalist regime, cancelled the next round of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The colloquial name for the military in Algeria (La Pouvoir) means power. Algeria’s deep 
state/military structure is much like Egypt’s, though Algeria did not see the same revolution as Egypt due 
to the alignments between the regime and the military. The deep state in Egypt is ostensibly in charge of 
the government, whereas in Algeria the military and regime are more intertwined. Recently though, 
Algerian police and security forces have been involved in some of the protests for higher wages during 
the Arab Spring, and despite their wages being fairly high, there is some contention between the state and 
its security forces because of this factor. This, to me, begs a question about the regime’s monopoly over 
the exercise of military force.  
presidential elections. The FLN was reinstalled as the leadership of the state, under the guise of a 
multiparty system. The resulting upheaval buried the country in a decade of devastating civil war 
in which thousands were killed, arrested, and tortured.  
In her discussion of Algerian civil society, Andrea Liverani assesses the diversity of the 
associational life10 within the state. Distinct tribal affiliations and community interests led to 
hundreds of new associative movements in the 1990s. Liverani demostrates that much of the 
mainstream dialogue surrounding this multitude of civil society movements treats the 
phenomenon as something indicative of the state’s growing social capital and trust; however, 
Liverani contends that this growth of associative movements is more likely born out of a highly 
stratified community that lacks social trust. She writes that “rather than a locus of reciprocity, 
solidarity, and cooperation, associations appear as the byproduct of increasingly conflict-ridden 
social relations…” and seem to be serving as a coping mechanism for the political change that 
occurred in the wake of the uproar of the 90s (Liverani, 2008).  
In Barriers to Democracy, Jamal (2007) reminds readers of the longstanding debate over the 
significance of the strength of associational life. Though a strong civil society may in some ways 
promote democratic ideals and practices, there are certainly devoutly authoritarian regimes with 
populaces that participate in a vibrant associational network. It could be argued that Algeria is 
one such state. For some scholars, it remains to be seen whether the strength of associational life 
can be considered an indicator of eventual democratization (Jamal, 2007). 
The Black Spring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Associational life is often an interchangeable term with civil society.	  
Towards the end of Algeria’s civil war in 2001, more protests erupted from within student 
demographics. These movements were from within a Kabyle demographic calling, once again, 
for cultural inclusion by the regime of the Berber communities; such as recognition of their 
language(s) and an educational system inclusive of those languages. It was at this stage that the 
regime made some concessions, labeling Tamazight a “national language” and promoting minor 
efforts to include it into the state’s educational framework (Raymond & Ali, 2014). Changes 
such as these often seem little, and in some cases within authoritarian regimes, are no more than 
policies designed to promote an image of liberalization that reinforces international legitimacy.  
The Arab Uprisings 
The question of why Algeria did not participate in the Arab Uprisings is a multifaceted one. 
Many political, social, and economic experts have explored the question of why Algeria did not 
participate in the Arab Uprisings in the same manner as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. For instance, 
Algeria and Tunisia have similar histories of secular authoritarian regimes though Algeria is 
more conservative than Tunisia. Tunisia’s history as an independent state has been more open to 
modernist approaches to policies and infrastructure, likely because colonial Tunisia did not 
experience the same level of devastation that colonial Algeria did. While both states have secular 
histories, the FLN regime of Algeria has promoted an Islamic state identity. This identity, while 
not directly incorporated into each and every institution of the state, has still integrally affected 
the approach of governance. So, while drawing connections between states that participated in 
the uprisings and states that did not can be useful, internal considerations have struck me as the 
most compelling explanations. Algeria’s entrenchedness in the oil industry and the economic 
implications of such an economy has been another common area of focus explored by 
researchers considering why Algeria did not see the same participation in the regional uprisings. 
Algeria’s economy is so significantly bolstered by the oil rents accrued by the oil production 
within the large geographic territory that the centralized government of the state is afforded the 
privilege of ultimate authority. Rentier states have the power to keep the status quo. One of the 
consequences of living, as a civilian, in an oil rentier state is that, on some level, individuals are 
sacrificing their right to representation by virtue of the low taxes imposed on them. Algeria is the 
only North African state to rely so heavily on oil income and industry (Lust, 2014). This oil 
factor links Algeria to the Gulf in a way that the rest of the North African states are not, perhaps 
lending a regional legitimacy by linking the FLN regime to the regimes of the Gulf. 
A significant catalyst of the 2011 protests across Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt was a pattern of 
economic disenfranchisement, especially within the younger demographics of the states. The call 
for democracy was intertwined with a hope that democratic process would shift the balance of 
the economy as well as enforce more equitable distribution of state wealth. Algeria, for the last 
several years, has faced a similar situation. According to World Bank reports (2015), Algeria’s 
unemployment rate has been resting around 10% since 2010, while the unemployment rate of 
women is at 16.3% and the rate for young Algerians has rested at 24.8%. All the same, as 
political turmoil erupted in the neighboring countries, the ripple effect into Algeria was minor. In 
the aftermath, several researchers have explored the whys and why-nots of Algeria’s lack of 
significant participation in the Arab Spring.  
Another primary reason that has been cited is the country’s intense and violent colonial 
history and the resulting independence struggle, which was similarly devastating. This collective 
memory can likely account for the reticence of older generations to push for reform. Similarly, 
there is collective memory of the equally brutal civil war of the early 1990s into 2002, which is 
still fresh enough to be more relevant in the minds of younger demographics. This, more so than 
a memory of the independence struggle, could explain the lack of a youth driven revolution such 
as occurred in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Compounded with other factors, such as the unique 
stability oil lends to the regime, these arguments about Algeria’s participation in the uprisings 
are certainly compelling. 
From my research, I have selected an additional argument that suggests that the influence of 
Algeria’s multicultural society, while it is vibrant enough to sustain the string of protests and 
internal uprisings, is not yet strong enough to make a tangible push for democracy (Iratni, 2014).  
The historical DNA of Algeria has designed the political structure that exists in Algeria 
today. Alongside this storyline, there is a highly integrated approach to language that the colonial 
and independent Algerian states have each taken that lead to an understanding of the modern day 
implications of language choice, Algerian identity, and the future of the Algerian regime. Down 
the line, could changes to these internal considerations about the economy, employment and 
wealth distribution, identity questions, and multicultural policies precede a shift into 
democratization?  
 
Algeria’s Politico-linguistic Context 
Language is a fundamental facet of daily life and it has provided a foundation for a long 
history of studies in a variety of disciplines: sociolinguistics, anthropology, political science, 
sociology, and even more fields. Moreover, language trends can be understood alongside many 
of the grounding principles of these areas of study. For instance, the term language 
rationalization harkens to Max Weber, a 19th century sociologist, whose definition of 
rationalization refers to the “process by which a state establishes efficient and orderly rule.” 
Language rationalization, by that account, reflects how a state uses language and language 
policies to support and reinforce an efficient, orderly infrastructure. (Laitin, 1992, p.10) The 
Arabization policies of Algeria (and those of neighboring states) are clear cases of language 
rationalization. In the case of this discourse, language rationalization can be understood as a 
hegemonic tool used by colonial powers and domestic powers alike within the region of North 
Africa.  
As demonstrated in the previous historical account, Algeria’s history includes a strong 
through line of language hegemony, which is noted as an often-overlooked factor in the political, 
economic, and social infrastructures of the state (Benrabah, 2014). The current and historical 
demographics of the state reflect the implications that come with such language power structures. 
As Laitin’s assessment reminds us: “…language policies that recognize all groups put heavy 
constraints on a young state, making more difficult the development of educational 
materials…”(p.63) and other necessary institutional components of state building. Essentially, 
while it is more culturally sensitive to promote a linguistically diverse country, from a state 
perspective, multilingualism does make the system more complex. Checks and balances between 
how a state like Algeria stabilizes itself in the wake of significant change, (i.e. a war for 
independence) and how that state might recognize the multiplicity of its citizenship make for a 
highly complex and challenging linguistic story.  
Algeria’s Modern Context  
Today’s Algeria is an example of a multilingual state, despite the state sponsored idea of 
monolingualism entrenched in their Algerian identity stake. Within the language dynamics, there 
is an enmeshed series of alignments between the social ideologies often represented by each 
language. For instance, Kabyle speakers often elect to speak French to make explicit statements 
and delineations about their identity. Conversely, within the formal sphere (i.e. on an 
institutional level) there is a dichotomous relationship between French and Arabic, both of which 
exist in highly standardized forms and are both utilized in the formal sphere (Dourari, 2014). 
This is contrasted against the collection of Berber languages, which do not have standardized 
forms or are only beginning to undergo that sort of deliberate language structuring.  
Though Algeria’s Arabization policies have rationalized Arabic in many spheres, it remains 
true that French is still a dominant feature of the Algerian economy. Both private and public 
sector jobs call for French language competency (Benstead & Reif, 2013). So, in realistic terms, 
Algeria has never successfully undergone a “total Arabization” since many of the economic, 
judicial, and higher academic institutions still function in the French language. 
The official language of modern Algeria is Arabic (CIA, 2013), with Classical Arabic touted 
as the language behind the state’s prescription of national identity. Even three decades past 
independence and in the heat of the Arabization policies, French remained a lingua franca. 
Academically, institutionally, and in the media, French was still prominent in the daily lives of 
Algerians (Morsly, 1984). To many Algerians, the French language represented the cooption of 
Arab identity, a secular oppression, a constraining of authentic identity. “[T]he refusal to 
recognize French language and culture is seen as a way of disposing of the influences left by the 
‘infidels’” (Benrabah, 2010, p.64). 
 This rich history of language interaction exists in multiple spheres. Certain environments 
calls for certain languages, or certain variations of those languages. Some are used in social 
spheres, others are produced in formal spheres. As in many multilingual environments, 
codeswitching11 in Algeria is a daily reality. According to Laitin (1992), the upper class of 
Algeria is “typically triglossic, in [Standard Arabic], French, and a mother tongue.” In Algeria, if 
individuals cannot speak French with a high level of competence (and many can’t because it’s 
typically taught in higher and private education), they will not have access to higher paid jobs. 
Benstead and Reif’s 2012 survey on a university campus in Algiers showed that there is 
statistically significant support for language and socioeconomic stratification alignment. Survey 
data indicate that language serves as a piece of “symbolic capital” and supports the prediction 
that survey respondents with a higher income are more likely on a statistically significant level to 
respond in French, given a choice between French and standard Arabic (Benstead & Reif, 2013). 
Benstead and Reif use this data to support Bourdieu’s contention that income and economic 
factors are valid indicators of language preference. This link between language and economic 
stratifications has already been made in these studies but I suggest that they should be expanded 
to consider how language attitudes and cultural delineations might have bolstered the protests 
that were connected to economic disenfranchisement and lack of employment opportunities.  
In any type of language environment, people develop both overt and covert attitudes about 
language. Moreover, what people say they believe about a language or they way they use it 
might not reflect how they use it in actuality. This is not, typically, due to any conscious 
dishonesty; rather, people are largely fundamentally unaware of how they actually use language. 
The behavior of using French, using Arabic, or using one of the Berber languages might serve to 
tell researchers about an individual’s covert attitudes about language or religion or politics of 
which she might be in fact be unaware (Walters). In turn, these assessments of how language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Codeswitching is a common tactic in multilingual environments where speakers 
alternate (codeswitch) between their languages, selecting the most appropriate variation 
for the circumstances.  
aligns with certain sets of beliefs or behaviors could help to illuminate voting patterns within 
certain demographics.  
Linguistic Theory 
Though there are several interdisciplinary focuses that consider linguistic and political 
environments, in general, I contend that many political science studies have overlooked the 
helpfulness of language studies to explore their area of interest. Language studies can be 
undertaken from a direct or indirect angle, making them versatile. A researcher can either ask 
directly about a respondent’s response to a particular language or can indirectly explore how 
their behaviors and beliefs are subtly directed by their covert attitudes about and toward 
languages. For the purpose of this thesis, I want to suggest that political science would do well to 
incorporate indirect language attitude study methodologies into political studies.  
Indirect language attitude studies like the Matched Guise technique could potentially account 
for the gray areas in the “language issue” of political science. Certainly language is not the sole 
explanation for complex systems but it can help to explain patterns. I contend that it has been 
underutilized as a tool to explore those patterns. Despite language being omnipresent, it remains 
that it is often overlooked. It can help to get into a closed society’s attitudes. It can deal with both 
social domain and formal domain languages. Though Dourari brushed French off as only in the 
formal domain, he is illustrating what is at stake in “the language issue” because despite being 
distinct domains, the formal and informal are inextricably linked on macro and micro levels. In 
Algeria, it’s important that researchers utilize language studies because Algeria’s people are 
aware of how language is used as a tool of the state. Especially because of the political censors in 
place in Algeria, using language attitudes as a way to gage political behavior might help to 
circumnavigate those censors while still being sensitive to them.  
The Matched Guise technique (Lambert et al., 1965) developed during the 1950s in Montreal 
by Lambert and his colleagues (Garrett, 2010) has been used successfully in many explorations 
of mono-, bi-, and multi-lingual language environments to solicit information about 
subconscious language attitudes that might impact the behavior and beliefs of individuals in 
these multi-lingual environments. This methodology has been employed in the postcolonial and 
post-national environment of Taiwan to explore the implication of the politicization of languages 
by China’s colonial presence and the treatment of indigenous Taiwanese (Chang & Lu, 2014). It 
has also been utilized by Chakrani (2011) in a sociolinguistic study of Morocco. These two 
studies have particular relevance to my argument and are relatable to the context of Algeria due 
to parallels in language policy and cultural context. I propose using this technique as a 
methodological approach to explore how language attitudes in Algeria might affect political 
behavior or have implications for assessing the future of a complex political arena such as 
Algeria.  
This technique has been successfully used to assess whether certain traits are associated with 
certain languages or language variations (Drager, 2014), which makes it an appropriate selection 
for addressing the topic in question: whether there are certain political beliefs are regularly 
associated with speakers of certain languages or language variations in Algeria. Especially at a 
time when the FLN regime will soon see a change in leadership, these studies might help explore 
how language trends could predict the viability of future leaders or the influence of liberalizing 
language policies introduced by the regime.  
The matched guise technique is useful because you can expand it to include many languages. 
It’s a flexible tool and the more languages that are included, the more complex the technique 
gets. The methodology does require being able to find someone who can produce all of the 
variations; however, this is what establishes control and provides a reliable set of survey 
materials. Ideally, it will be one (or possibly two people) who can authentically produce all of 
those variations. 
 
Discussion 
My only ambition is to invite the reader to look in a new way at a situation, 
whose description and assessment are in great part dominated by emotional 
reactions, ethnic and linguistic identities, ideological and political biases, and 
reductive misrepresentations. (Gafaïti, 2002)12 (p. 20) 
Gaps in the previous research and the construction of a largely dichotomous, rivalry-focused 
political scene make a compelling argument that the incorporation of a more comprehensive, 
inclusive set of language studies could shed light on the complex situation of Algerian society, 
identity, and political future. Especially in light of a variety of shifts occurring in Algeria and the 
surrounding region, I propose that this is the time to be honing in more directly on the Algerian 
context. Past language studies have been limited by censorship and restrictions and there isn’t a 
profound existing set of sociolinguistic studies directly in relationship to the state’s political 
patterns. Having a history of an almost-democratization, Algeria shows a recent series of 
changes could indicate a change in the regime. While the rest of the region saw dramatic and 	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violent political demonstrations and, in the case of Tunisia, a fairly rapid democratic transition, 
these subtle changes in Algeria could signal a similar but slower shift into democratic reform.  
Will the changes relating to leadership, freedom of the press, and more inclusive cultural and 
linguistic policies have an impact or will they simply function as appeasements?   
Now is the time to begin establishing more in-depth interdisciplinary studies in order to lay a 
framework to which future studies can be compared. These studies could also be adjusted and 
run in the neighboring countries so as to foster a regionally comprehensive and comparative 
foundation for politico-linguistic research in North Africa.  
Firstly, there is the question of leadership. President Bouteflika will no longer be a viable 
leader in the coming years, despite his electoral win in 2014. The case of Algeria is also unique 
in the Maghreb due to the strength maintained by the FLN, the political party of the current 
president, Bouteflika. In a series of articles in Aljazeera in the lead up to the April 2014 
elections, his leadership skills were called into question due to his ailing health and inability to 
participate. He refrained from giving any public speeches prior to the elections and only 
announced his candidacy two months prior to the elections. Despite this, and reinforcing the 
polity’s categorization as a single party dominant state, Bouteflika won the election for his fourth 
term in office.  
This inevitable shift in leadership could prompt more societal pushes for democracy or it is 
possible that his replacement will be from within the FLN. In this case, it could simply be a 
continuation of the same regime. 
Secondly, censorship and press restrictions are shifting. Though Algeria’s constitution allows 
freedom of the press, the reality since the Civil War has been that press has been state run and 
highly censored. For years, Freedom House has identified Algeria as “Not Free” in their 
assessment of civil liberties. Only recently has press autonomy begun to change and the Freedom 
House ranking has shifted from “not free” to “partially free.” Even so, there still remain specific 
topics that see censorship by the regime, such as reflections on the current leadership, terrorist 
activities, and anything that could be conceived as pro-Islamist. 
 State agencies regularly engage in both direct and indirect censorship. In January, 
a media blackout was imposed on coverage of the terrorist attack at the British 
Petroleum-operated gas plant in In Amenas. The Ministry of Communications 
blocked publication of two newspapers on May 19 when they attempted to print 
articles stating that Bouteflika’s health had deteriorated, despite official reports to the 
contrary. Self-censorship also remains widespread, motivated largely by a fear of 
defamation charges or other forms of government retaliation.  (Freedom House, 2014) 
 
In a state where social distrust is tangible and censorship is the status quo, citizens are afraid 
of talking honestly and self-censorship, even by publications that are privately run, is common. 
Environments such as this stifle the ability to gather authentic and comprehensive survey 
responses. With this in mind, if the censorship restrictions continue to loosen and make way for 
more diverse reporting that sees less self-censorship, I contend that a similar openness toward 
further liberalizing policies (that could precede democratization) might be on the horizon.  
Thirdly, there has been a recent shift in the ever-present language policies of Algeria. Despite 
years as a banned language under the FLN regime, in the wake of the Black Spring, Tamazight 
was labeled a national language (Raymond & Ali, 2014) and the state is allowing it to be taught 
in certain schools. Bilingual education could indicate a shift towards more pluralistic, inclusive 
educational policies that could pave the way for a multicultural, possibly even multinational 
state. Citing the High Commission for Berber Affairs (HCA) statistics (2012), Benrabah (2014) 
demonstrates the initial increase of Tamazight students from 1995 to 2012, though increasingly 
the state has under supported those efforts to foster Tamazight-inclusive education. This drop in 
enrollment and support for the programs seems to suggest that this instance of the state’s 
liberalized language policies—a nod to multiculturalism—could be an appeasement rather than a 
real precursor to lasting change. Wei (2008), considering the case of Taiwan under the colonial 
rule of China, makes the salient point that the “post-nationalistic” context of Taiwan is 
multicultural, having moved forward from the monolingual national vision of a China-dominated 
Taiwan. Her study lends support to my contention that with multiculturalist tides, comes a 
complimentary tide of democratization.  
Are these changes simply appeasements or are they signs of possible democratization at a 
slower place? At this juncture, I would not go so far as to call them predictive of the political 
condition of future Algeria. However, I would caution against writing them off altogether. These 
shifts are signals that I believe are significant enough to warrant the implementation of more in 
depth, interdisciplinary studies that utilize language and cultural signals to track political 
patterns.  
Proposed Methodology 
I propose using the Matched Guise technique as the foundation for a possible survey. In the 
case of Algeria, it would be appropriate to design a set of multi-lingual vignettes, which are 
matched in content and vary in language. Respondents would be exposed to these vignettes that 
feature standard varieties of French and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), the commonly spoken 
Algerian variation of colloquial Arabic Darija, and a variety of the Berber languages, certainly 
Kabyle. To control for ideological influence, these samples would ideally be neutral or matched 
in their content and therefore, it would follow that any answers to questions asked after exposure 
to the sample would be based on the individual’s reactions, conscious or subconscious, to the 
language the clip was presented in. The better the samples match in terms of content, the less 
likely it will be for respondents to be taking cues from the content of the sample as the basis for 
their opinions about leadership qualifications.  
It would also be important to expose respondents to each sample/language and account for 
gender distinctions. Without controlling for gender, there might be a spurious relationship 
between language variations, the language attitudes associated with them, and the assessment of 
political leadership skills. It might also be appropriate to explore whether gender has a 
significant influence over differing language attitudes. A study in Tunisia has shown that women 
are more likely to have fewer negative associations with the French language, while men are 
more likely to have negative associations left over from decades of French colonialism and 
language oppression (Walters, 2011). 
Garrett’s (2010) text outlines a variety of pros and cons of using the Matched Guise 
technique as a reliable methodology for exploring language attitudes in multilingual and 
multiethnic environments. He discusses the question of authenticity of accent as a common issue, 
relating to whether the accent is authentic or mimicked as well as the community that the accent 
variation might stem from. Garrett also highlights the issue of the “neutrality” of the content 
respondents are exposed to and whether the content could influence the reactions of the 
respondent. Despite the Matched Guise Technique’s usefulness and many successful studies, due 
to its strong history of use, there is certainly a long list of points of controversy. I would like to 
echo these concerns and add an additional caution to the list:  
In the theoretical foundation of sociolinguists, it is argued that it is the “quotidian, mundane 
communication” that influences an individual’s identity, rather than their identity dictating their 
behavior and beliefs (Benstead & Reif, 2013). This supports my contention that there is potential 
for language studies such as the Matched Guise Technique to reinforce negative structures of 
language hegemony. By asking respondents to reproduce their language attitudes (even and 
perhaps especially without their knowing the significance of their responses), the survey could be 
entrenching those attitudes that might be problematic.  
Chakrani (2011) reminds us that covert language attitudes (beliefs that people have that drive 
the way they behave and think about things) aren’t necessarily going to be articulated. For 
example, if asked to answer the specific question: “What do you think about Berber languages or 
French?” how people answer this question likely will not reflect what they really think or how 
they really behave. These are unconscious attitudes. MG techniques are useful in exposing covert 
attitudes. But, by asking these (MG) questions, researchers might be cementing attitudes that are 
harmful. Even if the respondent may not pick up on what you’re rooting around for, they still 
might solidify these behaviors further. Chakrani’s article challenges the existing literature on the 
“trichotomous” language system of Morocco, which parallels Algeria’s. He insists that as studies 
reinforce the attitudinal conflict between SA, MA & French, there is potential to only further 
promote the hegemonic language interaction. Though unique in its own ways, Algeria’s 
infrastructure and linguistic make up mimic Morocco’s in enough ways to suggest that a similar 
conclusion can be drawn confidently.  
The Berber Spring and the Berber Cultural Movement that developed from the pluralistic, 
cultural movements calling for a more tolerant language environment couched in a democratic 
regime, perhaps, make a subconsciously similar argument. Citizens of multilingual communities 
would certainly be aware of the reality of codeswitching and de-emphasizing the formal 
language stratifications would, over time, soften the attitudes that contribute to language 
hegemony. For instance, those attitudes about French specifically viewed as “modern” or 
colloquial Arabics as unable to “tackle formal topics and discussions of a technical nature” as is 
believed in Morocco. (Chakrani, 2011, p. 168-9)  
Conclusion 
While language attitude studies are certainly valuable to exploring how complex linguistic 
structures affect state infrastructure and promote or challenge the advancement of society, it 
would be pertinent to be sensitive to how relying on these studies might only cement further the 
hegemony that disadvantages the greater demographic. Chakrani argues that reinforcing the 
language attitudes that “polarize” the languages in question, even unintentionally, by means of a 
sociolinguistic study, might only further entrench the language attitudes. As such, any efforts to 
implement these types of language studies should be done with attention to the design of the 
survey so as to avoid reinforcing the negative language power structures.  
To round off this exploration of Algeria’s history and the history of literature that has been 
developed on the region, I return to Iratni’s (2014) assessment of Algeria’s participation in the 
uprisings of 2011. His research highlighted the continuous presence of multilingual and 
multicultural factors on the ground in Algeria that, due to state identity and the stability of the oil 
economy, do not play a dynamic role in the governance of the state. Iratni concludes that that 
continued power of the regime comes down to the question of oil revenues and wealth 
distribution.  Despite the omnipresence of multiculturalism that is a core characteristic of the 
state, if the economic infrastructure continues to make minor concessions to support the 
population, the multicultural reforms being called for will not have the strength to prompt a 
significant shift in the regime. Though in general I can support his argument, I also believe that 
his assessment might contribute to the literature that Gafaiti (2002) refers to as “reductive 
misrepresentations.” Language attitude studies have the potential to deliver a more in-depth 
evaluation of these political assessments. Though many researchers, and many of the sources I 
have pulled from, do rely on multidimensional assessments of Algeria and its future, my 
argument demonstrates the need for a much more comprehensive interdisciplinary approach.  
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